Philosophy of Mind

Oxford's graduate philosophy conference turns thirty, with Chalmers on the bill

Oxford's philosophy conference for graduate students meets for the thirtieth time on 13 and 14 November. The keynote speakers are David Chalmers, Monima Chadha and Rob Simpson. One detail of the design separates it from the ordinary student gathering: every paper draws a reply from an Oxford faculty member.

David Chalmers

What is a concept? A twenty-two-chapter inquiry from Cambridge

'Concept' is among the words philosophy uses most and questions least. A new Cambridge collection follows its history from ancient Greece to Chinese and Indian thought, from Islamic philosophy to Kant and on to conceptual engineering. The result is less a history of philosophy than philosophy inspecting its own instrument.

Thirty years on, Chalmers has not solved the hard problem — but he has kept it alive

When he set out the hard problem of consciousness in 1996, artificial intelligence was still a laboratory matter. In June the book's thirtieth anniversary was debated in Bochum. Chalmers now argues that virtual reality is real, that machine consciousness is possible in principle, and that the real danger lies in erring in the wrong direction.

Eric Schwitzgebel, David Chalmers, Peter Godfrey-Smith

Octopus, bee, crow: the consciousness debate moves beyond the human

The declaration signed in New York in 2024 held that consciousness in birds and mammals enjoys strong scientific support, and that in fishes, reptiles, cephalopods and insects it is 'a realistic possibility'. A conference at Duke in November asks the next question: what is welfare, and how is it measured?

Peter Singer, David Chalmers, Peter Godfrey-Smith

Fog ahead: we will not know whether machines are conscious in time

The argument of Eric Schwitzgebel's book, out from Cambridge in August, cuts against both camps: consciousness in artificial systems is neither obviously impossible in the near future nor obviously inevitable. The real difficulty is that the moment we have to decide will arrive long before the moment we could know.

Luciano Floridi, Eric Schwitzgebel, David Chalmers, Peter Godfrey-Smith

Cavell at the New School: art, other minds and scepticism

The New School for Social Research is giving Stanley Cavell two days on 30 and 31 October. The focus falls on his writings about art — and on the constitutive part that scepticism about other minds plays in his reading of it. Alice Crary and Jay Bernstein are among the speakers.

The welfare of the machine: a new Cambridge book asks the question early

Geoff Keeling and Winnie Street's book in the Cambridge Elements series sets out, in orderly fashion, a question with no answer yet: can an artificial intelligence system have welfare, and if it can, what follows for us? One author works at Google — a detail that explains where the book stands.

A prize for disagreement: the 2026 Lebowitz goes to two rival theorists of memory

The rule behind the APA and Phi Beta Kappa's Lebowitz Prize is unusual: the winners must be two philosophers defending opposing views on the same question. In 2026 it went to Felipe De Brigard and Sarah Robins. The question they disagree about looks simple: is remembering a kind of imagining?

Lebowitz Prize goes to memory: De Brigard and Robins to face each other

The American Philosophical Association's prize picks its winners not for what they agree on but for what they do not. This year it goes to Felipe De Brigard and Sarah Robins — both philosophers of memory, and each with a different view of what memory is.